Several studies have shown that category scales are nonlinearly related to ratio scales of subjective magnitude. A variability model has been proposed previously to account for this departure from linearity. This article examines the model in the light of the empirical relations that enter into it: the ratio scale of subjective magnitude, the corresponding category scale, and the variability of judgments in both physical and psychological units. These relations are determined, through repeated measurement with a single observer, for the psychological continuum, loudness, and its inverse, softness. The ratio scales are shown to be reciprocals, and the category scales complements. The category scale of softness is more concave downward, relative to its magnitude scale, than is the category scale of loudness. This outcome is also derived mathematically from the empirical equations relating the four scales to physical magnitude. Variability is found to increase with increasing stimulus magnitude at the same rate for both loudness and softness productions, expressed either in physical units or in psychological units. Hence, the variability model is found not to accord with the observed difference in concavity between softness and loudness category scales relative to their respective psychological magnitude scales.
INTRODUCTION
A NUMBER of psychophysical studies have shown that category scales are nonlinearly related to ratio scales of subjective magnitude on prothetic continua? Stevens and Guirao 2 provide the most recent account of this observed departure from linearity in terms of a variability model. This model starts from the assumption that ratio-scaling procedures (magnitude estimation, magnitude production, and crossmodality matching) provide valid measures of the psychological continuum, and then seeks to explain the nonlinear relation between category and ratio scales in terms of the variability associated with judgments along the continuum. According to Stevens and Guirao, variability is not constant along the psychological con- tinuum, but increases with increasing magnitude. Consequently, when an observer attempts to assign stimuli to categories equally spaced in psychological units, he makes fewer errors at low psychological magnitudes, where he can easily discriminate two points that are separated by a given distance, and he makes more errors at higher magnitudes, where two points, although separated by the same distance, are not so easily discriminated and, hence, are assigned more often to the same category. The graphic outcome is that the category scale appears concave downward when plotted against the magnitude scale?
This article examines the variability model in the light of an empirical example of the relations that enter into it: the ratio scale of subjective magnitude, the corresponding category scale, and the variability of judgments in both physical and psychological units. These relations are determined, through repeated measurement with a single observer, for the psychological continuum, loudness, and its inverse, softness. Our subject, who began as an untrained observer, gave judgments of sensory magnitude according to four procedures: (1) magnitude production of loudness, (2) category production of loudness, (3) magnitude production of softness, and (4) category production of softness. The corresponding sets of instructions, read to the subject before each session, were as follows (the words in the parentheses were used when appropriate):
Magnitude production. "This is an experiment to see how you perceive the loudness (softness) of sounds. When the experiment begins, I will present a standard sound to you. Call the loudness (softness) of this sound '10.' I will then present a series of numbers, one at a time. Your task will be to adjust the noise so that its loudness (softness) stands in the same proportion to the called 'one,' and the loudness (softness) of the second will be called 'five.' I will then present a series of numbers from one to five in irregular order. You should regard these numbers as marking off equal distances in loudness (softness). Your task is to adjust the noise so that its loudness (softness) corresponds to the number I have given you."
For magnitude production, the standard loudness had a sound pressure of 1.78#bar (79dB, soundpressure level); it was presented and identified at the start of the stimulus series and again after every 25th determination. One hundred forty determinations were obtained for each criterion value (2.5, 5, 10, 20, 40) in irregular order; they were collected in five sessions, lasting approximately two hours each.
For category production, the sound pressures defining the end categories were the geometric means of the sound pressures assigned to the lowest and highest values in the corresponding magnitude-production experiments (0.31 and 17.6ubar for loudness; 10.5 and 0.275 abar for softness). These levels were also presented and identified at the outset and after every 25th determination. Four sessions were employed.
Apparatus
The subject was seated in a sound-treated room; he 
Category Scales vs Magnitude Scales
When the category scale is plotted as a function of the magnitude scale for loudness [- Fig. 3(f)3 and for softness [-Fig. 4(f) •, a curious result is obtained. In linear coordinates, both scales are concave downward; however, in semilog coordinates, the scale for loudness is concave upward, that for softness concave downward. It follows that the degree of concavity, in linear coordinates, is greater for the softness function than it is for the loudness function. The logarithmic transforluation on the abscissa overcorrects the downward concavity of the loudness scale and leaves the function slightly concave upward. This same transformation on the softness scale does not straighten the function, which still remains slightly concave downward.
The differing concavities of the softness and loudness category scales, relative to their corresponding ratio scales, turn out to be a necessary consequence of (may be derived mathematically from) the empirical form of these four scales, which were described in the previous section. Using the equations stated earlier, we may derive an expression for the category scale as a function of psychological magnitude. Specifically: When the expressions relating category and magnitude scales of softness and loudness are applied to the group data collected by Stevens and Guirao (Fig. 6) , we find an equally good fit and confirmation of the conclusion that the concavities of these two functions necessarily differ.
Eisler • has reported findings that appear, at first, to contradict this conclusion. In three series of experiments in which subjects gave magnitude and category estimates of the loudness and softness of noise, the functions relating category scales to log magnitude were found to be concave upward for both loudness and softness. However, an examination of the functions relating psychological magnitude (magnitude estimation) to sound pressure (Fig. 7) 
Variability Model
The variability model relates the degree of concavity of the category scale (when plotted against psychological magnitude) to the increase in variability with increasing psychological magnitude. The arguments presented above show that it is necessarily true that this concavity is greater for softness than it is for loudness. If the variability hypothesis is to be in accord with the necessary outcome, then one or both of two conditions must exist: (1) psychological variability is greater for softness than it is for loudness; (2) psychological variability grows at a faster rate for softness than for loudness. In this section, we examine variability in the magnitude and category production of loudness and of softness. When variability is expressed in psychological units, it increases with increasing magnitude for both loudness and softness. The frequency distributions are, once again, slightly skewed toward higher intensities. If the variability hypothesis is to account for the differing concavities of the loudness and softness scales, it is necessary that variability be either greater or grow more rapidly for softness than for loudness. Figure 11 presents the standard deviation of magnitude productions in psychological units as a function of the mean psychological magnitude for both scales. When straight lines were fit to the loudness and softness points separately (by the method of least squares), a small difference in the slopes of the lines, 0.03, suggested that indeed the variability of softness productions grew more rapidly, however slightly, than the variability of loudness productions. This inference was not borne out by an F test of the ratio of the variances at several corresponding points along the least-squares lines. In fact, the line of best fit to the softness data at no point fell within the region that permitted rejection (a= 0.01) of the null hypothesis that the softness and loudness variances were sampled from the same population. Since the variability of loudness and of softness productions grows at approximately the same rate as a function of psychological magnitude, the variability model fails to account for the difference in concavity between the loudness and softness category scales relative to their magnitude scales.
Va•'iability i•t Physical Unils
This conclusion does more than curtail slightly the explanatory power of the variability model as it applies to the relations among psychophysical scales. The observed difference in concavity of the loudness and softness category scales, relative to their magnitude scales, is not an epiphenomenon; it is deduced mathematically from the "basic" psychophysical scales: magnitude and category scales of loudness and softness as a function of sound pressure. Predictions from the variability model did not accord with this deduction (and the obtained data) in this experiment. Therefore, the variability model was found to be incompatible with the basic psychophysical functions, to whose relations that it applies. 
